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There are abroad in the world today two tacit answers to the 
perennial question, "What is the meaning of life ? " Characte- 
ristic of one answer is the claim that life's meaning is only 
understood through revelation. Without revelation, we are 
warned, life is meaningless, it leads only to nihilism. Current 
revelations are both sacred and secular, sometimes divine 
and sometimes demonic. This answer is called the "religious" 
answer. The second answer is that only a life of reason can be 
meaningful or hold any promise-and by reason, one usually 
means a life directed by the judgments of science. Now let me 
not mislead the reader into thinking that the way of religion 
is irrational or that the way of science does not have its 
revelations, its flashes of insight, its moments of ecstasy. 
I only wish to make clear what seems to me to be the sine 
q.ua non of each. 
Philosophy is not, however, satisfied with either answer. 
Each, accepted separately, seems to rob man of those elements 
of his nature which characterize his humanness, i.e., both 
answers taken in isolation remove from him the responsibility 
of being an individual. It is necessary of course to defend 
this claim. But at  the risk of sounding platitudinous, I must 
say that we all now live in an age which ill affords any collec- 
tive dehumanization of man. The continuous stockpiling of 
attitudes (in the form of "systems of belief" which fall into 
one "camp" or another) fares well to man's tragic extinction. 
Thus it seems to me that philosophy's primary task today is 
to struggle to re-establish communication between the "reli- 
gious" and the "scientific" answers in order to foster our 
survival. The burden of this paper is to trace the path which 
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philosophy seeks to sail if it is not to founder and lose its 
significance on the Scylla of religion or in the Charybdis of 
science. 
Karl Jaspers once wrote that philosophy-even as Christi- 
anity-has its "saints. " Socrates, Boethius, Bruno-all were 
martyred for steering a philosophical course. They are never 
considered great philosophers, nor are their philosophical 
conclusions particularly important, but they have always 
been the "holy," the "set-apart" ones because they perished 
for their philosophical commitment. When the scientist 
Galileo recanted of his heliocentric universe theory, he needed 
merely to bide his time until science revealed the foolishness 
of his tormentors. His was, it seems to me, an easy truth. 
I t  lay within the context of "objectivity." Objective truth 
demands objective answers. "The book is on the table." Is it, 
or is it not? To affirm the claim or to deny it ends the case 
for objectivity. But, when Giordano Bruno refused to recant, 
he died on the martyr's pyre. His was a difficult truth-philo- 
sophical truth, not scientific truth. Both men acted in keeping 
with the truth to which they were committed and for which 
they had to stand; but one truth would suffer by retraction, 
the other would not. 
Galileo's objective truth is a truth which stands without 
Galileo. It has the Platonic character of universality about i t ;  
its validity is unhistorical and timeless. However, we should 
not allow such a truth to beguile us as it did Plato. I t  is not 
absolute ; rather, it depends on finite premises and a method 
of attaining knowledge which involves stipulative procedures 
and pragmatic ends. On the other hand, Bruno could not 
recant; for when he reached that point where he believed 
that he had plumbed the depths of reality, to deny this fact 
would have been to deny his inward sense of integrity; and 
what is more fundamental, it would have been completely 
alien to his sense of what was true to his experience-in a 
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phrase, it would have robbed him of his freedom to seek truth. 
Galileo acted as a scientist-Bruno acted as a philosopher. 
Let us observe what is peculiar to Bruno's philosophical 
truth. (I) Philosophical truth is belief accruing from knowl- 
edge. To think-and to think free from contradiction-is 
basic. "Cognition" is the primary instrument of philosophy. 
The philosophical procedure is never intended to be irrational; 
philosophy stands unreconciled to the attempt of any who 
would establish the truth upon the irrational. The irrational 
is, at  its core, merely negation. Therefore there must be 
nothing which is not questioned, no secret which is withheld 
from inquiry, nothing which is permitted to veil itself. I t  is 
through the process of critique that meaning, and hence 
knowledge, is to be acquired. (2)  The result of such a procedure 
frequently acts as a descriptive iconoclasm. Philosophers 
consciously seek to pull down man's irrational idols. In a 
certain measure they are asking man to analyze his "reason 
for his reasons." We might say, man as a philosopher carries 
on a dialogue with the "gods," but as a philosopher, one is 
frighteningly aware of the fact that the dialogue is onesided 
-the conversation proceeds only as he speaks. The gods 
remain silent. Therefore, in a subordinate sense, philosophy 
is a therapy one conducts with himself as long as he lives 
(Wittgenstein) -and this therapy has for its basic principle 
the conviction that health (salvation) is only acquired when 
man rigorously struggles to apply that uniqueness of his 
nature which sets him off from the brutes-his capacity to 
think. (3) Finally, philosophy acts as a liaison between the 
"ideologists" and the "scientists," in the manner of a trans- 
lator of alien languages. He seeks to keep open the lines of 
communication between idealism and realism, between the 
eternal and the temporal. 
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Let us consider the philosopher's conversation with both 
the religious and the scientific man, beginning with his 
confrontation with religion. 
There are a t  least four significant relationships between 
religion and philosophy. Initially, there is the common quest 
of both after what is called the "monotheistic abstraction" 
(Schrodinger) , i. e., the pursuit of unity, the rejection of 
desultory idols and of superficial asides, a dogged tracking of 
the final answer, the right answer, the "truth," and the 
commitment to this "truth," one's ultimate allegiance to the 
highest value. Religion traditionally labels its answer with 
the honorific title, "God." Philosophers have had many 
names for their answer-the good, the true, the beautiful, 
the absolute, reality, being. 
On the one hand, to the religious, the philosopher's God is 
pale, vapid, threadbare-as Blaise Pascal says, the philoso- 
pher's God is never the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. 
But on the other hand, philosophy distrusts religious images 
of God because they are frequently seductive idols, magnified 
into proportions which fit the picture world of its pious 
followers. Sometimes, in the eyes of the philosopher, religion 
can have a cultic aspect-an intense devotion to its conception 
of the holy, to its community of believers and to its priesthood, 
all combining to make many of the religiously indoctrinated 
terrifyingly certain of their beliefs. Frequently the apolo- 
gists of such cultic manifestations find any disagreement 
with their conviction merely the aberrational mutterings 
of untransformed pagans. Philosophers must guard them- 
selves against such cultic commitment-rather, they must 
accede to the individual's complete freedom in his search of 
knowledge. 
A second relationship important to both religion and philo- 
sophy is the principle of faith; but philosophy has a rather 
restricted use for the term "faith." Faith, philosophically, 
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means the willingness to hold a belief which reaches beyond 
the structures of phenomenal verification. Sometimes philo- 
sophers refer to this as the "risk of faith" (Kierkegaard). 
Philosophical faith involves such a risk-an intellectual 
gamble, or a learned surmise. And the philosopher is very 
much aware that his claims might be demonstrated at  some 
future time, by the process of objectivity, to be sheer nonsense. 
However, the philosopher does not intend that such a faith 
be understood as a rearguard retreating action, i.e., an attempt 
to hold to certain types of unsubstantiated nonsense until 
empirical research finds us out. Rather, philosophical faith 
is the awareness in man as an autonomous creature that over- 
belief (James) is the indispensible basket in which all des- 
criptions of reality must be carried. Man's overbeliefs sustain 
him psychologically and provide for him goals which protect 
him from stagnation. Faith acts as a catalyst for creativity 
and is the conceptual foundation of values; ostensibly faith 
is the ground of man's idealism. 
Also it seems to me that the conception of prayer exhibits a 
third possible relationship between religion and philosophy. 
Prayer is, philosophically, the personification of one's quest 
after the absolute answer. Prayer is the legitimate mode of 
"hypostatizing" what one considers ultimate-that which 
demands our worship, that which we are prepared to kneel 
before. Einstein once called this act "my reverence for the 
mystery of the Universe." Thus the act of prayer, philosophi- 
cally, has the effect of making man a devoted and responsive 
adventurer in his quest for understanding, rather than indo- 
lent and passive. 
Finally, the principle of revelation, which is commonly 
described by the religious as the immediate and objective 
utterance of God-" the light for the path" (Tillich)-need 
not be utterly rejected by the philosopher. He too seeks the 
final confirmation of reality-of God, if you wish. That is to 
say, he also responds to the ecstasy of the "truth," the con- 
firmation of his thought concerning what must be-what is- 
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that which is not alien to his conception of what is indeed the 
"light on his path." 
Obviously much more should be said about philosophy's 
dialogue with religion, but now I must turn briefly to the 
philosopher's dialogue with science. Philosophy and science 
are permanently wedded in one respect-each establishes 
reason and the empirical process as basic to its methodology. 
And yet, philosophy is, on frequent occasions, the critic of 
science. Space will not permit me to engage in a lengthy 
analysis of all the points of contact which these two disciplines 
maintain (even if I could), so I shall limit myself to a single 
issue : Man's nature. 
What is man? How should he be understood? Science 
shows us remarkable and highly important things about man; 
but as science offers more and more clarity and precision 
concerning man, it becomes more and more evident that 
this insight compounds the mystery of man's final definition. 
Science's need of precision forces it to abandon scope. All 
of the variables necessary for an explanation of man (even 
if they were all known, which they certainly are not) cannot 
be subsumed in a single calculus. Some of these variables must 
be sacrificed if any results are to be secured. Man is always 
more than he knows about himself. In a biological sense, 
man is perhaps best described as a central nervous system 
with electrical impulses charging up and down certain vascular 
conduits. And yet, this definition only partially describes 
man-never is it adequate for understanding man as a mower 
of lawns, or a woman under the hair dryer. In so far as we 
make our conception of man scientific, we confine ourselves 
to the world of masses in motion. We deliberately sacrifice 
our conception of man as an individual. But if we seek to 
preserve a "something more" about man's nature by reaching 
beyond the categories of science, have we actually added 
anything more to our understanding of man ? I t  is my convic- 
PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE 7 
tion that we have. We should not be reluctant to define 
man in extra-scientific categories ; in fact, to confine our 
definition of man to the precise claims of science is to subtract 
much of the experience which we all apprehend to be part of 
man. To the question, "What is man?" the answer, "Only 
a sophisticated ape," is inappropriate. But why ? Because, 
this explanation necessarily fragmentizes man, i.e., biology 
only answers some of the questions which torment us concern- 
ing our own nature. All explanations-mathematical, physical, 
biological, psychological, theological-only encompass seg- 
ments of our experience. 
It is necessary to understand man in a broader, a multi- 
descriptive sense. The task has fallen to philosophy, first to 
listen to science's explanations of man, recognize the signifi- 
cance of its objective "truth," then to listen to religion's-or 
any other discipline's-reply, and thus to translate each 
system's conclusions in the terms of the other, taking great 
care not to destroy the actual description of man through too 
severe a bifurcation, or too extreme a reduction. 
But while doing this, philosophy must not forget its icono- 
clastic role. Frequently, for example, philosophy finds it 
necessary to question some of the assumptions of religion or 
science. Consider the problem which arises concerning 
science's inability to give final explanations. Because science 
cannot demonstrate phenomenalistically the origin of the 
Universe, it does not in itself provide for religion a logical 
basis for its metaphysical explanation. An argument ad 
ignorarttiam proves nothing. On the other hand, the scientist's 
constant obsession with reductionism must also be resisted by 
the philosopher. To suggest that man is adequately understood 
as a series of electrical impulses is to reduce man to the status 
of a mechanism, wholly abstracted from his existence as a 
spiritual being. In truth, man must include the religious nature, 
the man of the spirit, as well as the biological man. 
Essentially, then, the philosopher can neither determine 
how the theologian or the scientist must answer his questions, 
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nor what these answers will be. Rather, the philosopher is 
the interpreter and the critic (as Socrates has urged) who 
constantly calls each discipline to account for its assertions. 
Perhaps Herman Melville's most lyrical lines depict the 
philosopher's place in our contemporary age : 
Doubts of all things earthly, and intuitions of some things 
heavenly; this combination makes neither believer nor infidel, 
but makes a man who regards them both with equal eye. 
And so it is that philosophical truth has a strange way of 
melting away. For philosophical truth in a sense goes beyond 
philosophizing-it is found in experience which is not philoso- 
phical but scientific or religious. And when the philosopher 
speaks to this experience he is in reality no more, it seems 
to me, the philosopher but the scientist or the theologian- 
and that is another story. 
